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The ideology of the British National Party 
 
Since the end of the 1990s, Extreme Right Parties (hereafter ERP) have played a direct 
role in the governments, the parliaments and the local councils of many European countries 
such as, among others, Greece, Flanders (northern Belgium), Switzerland, France, Austria and 
Italy. From one case to another, ERP share or have shared political power, directly or 
indirectly, locally or nationally, alone or in coalitions. In other words, what used to be widely 
feared and presented as a potential return to the “dark years” of fascism has become reality: 
ERP are now holding political office. As power went to these new parties first in Austria, then 
in Italy, France (at local level) and so on, the words used to describe them had to be changed 
as a way to legitimise their arrival on the mainstream scene, and the “racists” became 
“populist” or “national-populist”,1 the Nazis became “parties with extremist trends”; the 
fascists became the “radical right”.2 
If it is understandable in the political arena, such word-changes are not helpful in the 
field of political science and have made it increasingly difficult to identify the extreme right 
in contemporary Europe. Can one still apply the term “fascist” to a party like Aleanza 
National (AN) which has operated a deep change in ten years in terms of programme and 
speeches and which has shared power with Forza Italia (FI) for many years led by Silvio 
Berlusconi? Should we consider Switzerland to have become a racist state since the Union 
Démocratique du Centre (UDC) is deeply rooted in the local and national political life? Can 
one view France’s Front national (FN) as a mere relic of Pétainism when it made it into the 
second round of the presidential election (May 2002),when cities such as Toulon, Orange, 
Marignane and Vitrolles have had mayors from the FN which held power in local councils, or 
more recently when it got 17.9 per cent of the vote during the first round of the 2012 
presidential election, becoming the third political force?  
It is very difficult to use the old words to characterize those parties in power today and, 
to a great extent, it was a lot easier in the past when they were small and noisy racist parties 
denying the Holocaust and singing Hitlerian chants. The evolution of ERP over the last thirty 
years has been a challenge for political science and to no surprise, the UK, and more precisely 
England and its ERP, has not escaped the phenomenon. 
This article will explore the ideology of the British National Party (BNP), its recent 
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evolution and its position today regarding the political landscape, mainstream parties and 
democratic values. It will first come back on the particular history of ERP in England 
regarding other European countries and second, look at its electoral evolution. It will then 
take into account the current position of the BNP and assess whether the party still belongs to 
the ERP’s family. The concepts of “extreme right” and “populism” will be detailled and 
compared so as to argue that if the BNP is still part of the ERP’s family on some issues, it also 
belongs today to the populist family on other points, a family which is more “anti-elite”-
oriented than purely racist, anti-Semitic or xenophobic, a family that does not embody the 
same kind of threat to liberal values and democracy and take advantage of a kind of 
"democratic legitimization"3. As a consequence, it will be shown that this current hybrid 
position might partially explain why BNP leaders can more easily participate in mainstream 
politics and public debates where previously they would have been banned. In conclusion, in 
a comparative perspective with other ERP, this evolution will let us define the position of the 
BNP in the political landscape in relation to the democratic values and mainstream politics of 
the UK. 
 
The British National Party as a failure 
 
The literature says ERP followed the same path as its counterparts in Europe, and at the 
same time it says it is an exception unable to move away from its marginal status.  
The marginal status of ERP in England has been analysed from different perspectives. 
The first possible explanation lies in the ideological position of other mainstream parties on 
specific topics understood to represent the ERP. As Bowyer explains, “the decline of the 
National Front in the late 1970s coincided with the return to government of the Conservative 
Party, which under Margaret Thatcher’s leadership advocated restrictive immigration policies 
and appeared to capture votes of many of the NF’s one-time supporters”.4 In fact, at the end of 
the 1970s, Margaret Thatcher, following example of Enoch Powell,5 said “Conservatives will 
put in place a deep and strict control of immigration because ‘people in this country are very 
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afraid to be invaded by people from another culture’”.6 
This tough position on immigration helps explain why the ERP have had few successes 
in the past; it also shows why the Conservative Party is still able today to mobilize support 
against immigration since this kind of claim has been appropriated by the Conservatives.7 
Another explanation lies in the British first-past-the-post electoral system that makes it 
extremely difficult for a small party to win representation. This system helps big parties to 
gain many seats while ousting from Parliament small political groups who do not already 
have a large electoral base.8 Even if this argument worked convincingly in the past, the 
success of a third party, such as the Liberal Democrats during the 2010 general election, 
shows the argument’s limits today. 
A third explanation about ERP’s marginal status on the British political scene relies on 
the so-called schismatic tendency of such parties. According to John and Margetts, “British 
extreme right parties have often been divided and poorly organized, suffering from splits, 
competing personalities and antagonistic factions, which does not offer a fertile tradition for 
these parties to follow.”9 
Finally, it is also possible to describe the voters’ rejection of ERP in England by 
focusing on the nature of British culture regarding fascism. On the one hand, fascism is a sort 
of alien ideology that never took root in England and consequently lacks legitimacy and 
credibility among the population. On the other hand, a national political culture based on 
civility, tolerance and accommodation between social groups prevents the British people from 
being attracted to such a radical position.10 
Those arguments are among the most cited to explain the marginality of ERP, a 
marginality that let Goodwin to write that, “traditionally, the far right in England has been 
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associated with failure”11. 
If the French Front national (FN) and many other parties such as the Vlaams Belang 
(VB) in northern Belgium or the Union Démocratique du Centre (UDC) in Switzerland could 
enter the political arena after five, ten or more years (the FN was created in 1972 and became 
electorally powerful only in 1984), England’s ERP did not follow this continental trend. The 
National Front (NF) which increased its electoral ratings during the 1970s, and the BNP, 
which is today the most powerful ERP in England, never had any electoral success at the 
national level. Bowyer yet argues that “the BNP has emerged as an increasingly viable force 
in local elections in many parts of England since 2002, expanding its slate of candidates 
contesting these elections and winning a growing number of seats on several local councils”.12 
In fact, it is possible to find arguments talking about a political failure isolated at the margins, 
it is also possible to claim that these electoral gains surpass all previous electoral battles, 
making the BNP a national phenomenon, “widespread across several regions”, and not merely 
a “movement confined to specific regions”.13 
 
The electoral ascent of the BNP 
 
During the sixties, negotiations are undertaken between different fascist groups in order 
to gather and to federate all tendencies, parties and people from the radical right in a sole, 
unique and unified organization. The aim is to build a political platform able to focus mainly 
on the struggle against migrations; it will be personified by the birth of the National Front led 
by Martin Webster and John Tyndall. Among others, in the beginning of the seventies, the NF 
will denounce political asylum and more specifically the entrance in the United Kingdom of 
about 30 000 Asians evicted from Uganda by the regime of Amin Dada. At that time, the NF 
also suggests the UK should stay out of the European Union, the only party stating such a 
proposal at that time.   
 
During the seventies, the NF will progress thanks to its leaders who appear in the media in 
numerous debates on issues such as migrations, political asylum and the threat of the 
“invasion” of the country. In 1977, the NF will become the fourth party in terms of electoral 
power before its decline two years later when multiple antiracist NGO’s will denounce the 
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true faith of the party’s members – usually linked to Nazi and fascist groups-, and when at the 
same time Margaret Thatcher will attract many electors back to the conservative wing. 
 
In 1982, John Tyndall, who was still the co-leader of the National Front (NF) along with 
Martin Webster, started a new party called the British National Party14. The new organisation 
managed to gather many militants and senior members from the late NF and other small 
radical parties. At the general election of 1983, the BNP presented five candidates but had a 
poor showing, slowly progressing until 1990 when John Major succeded Margaret Thatcher—
a change which was to arouse new hopes. At that time, many electors stopped supporting the 
Conservatives, accusing them of being too soft on issues like Europe, immigration, asylum 
seekers, etc. At the 1993 local elections, the BNP managed to get one seat (Derek Beackon) in 
a popular district of London. This new “success” was however not to be followed by futher 
victory. At the general election of 1997, the BNP received only 1.35 per cent of the votes.15 
Nick Griffin, the current leader of the BNP, replaced John Tyndall in October 1999 and 
substantially reformed the party both in terms of organization as in terms of public image. 
According to Bowyer, “the BNP was able to capitalize on popular fears over the number of 
refugees seeking asylum in Britain and it attracted much attention in the summer of 2001 
when riots in several northern cities coincided with strong showings by several BNP 
candidates in the June general election”.16 At the May 2002 local elections, less than a year 
after 9/11, the BNP started a campaign against Muslims and presented candidates in more 
than 60 constituencies; it obtained a relative success in Oldham and three councillors in 
Burnley. Both cities had been affected by violent riots a year before.17 
According to Renton, the “2003 local elections in the United Kingdom resulted in the 
British National Party winning levels of support unmatched by any far right party in British 
history”,18 the BNP gained new seats in 16 different cities such as Sandwell, Dudley, Stoke-
on-Trent, Broxbourne and Burnley where the number of BNP councillors grew from three to 
eight. In Burnley, the election occurred within a “context of spiralling socioeconomic 
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deprivation and political disaffection directed predominantly towards the local Labor 
council”.19  
Comparing the results of the BNP at the European election with 800,000 votes in 2004 
and 100,000 votes in 1999, and comparing the support for the BNP at the general election of 
1997 with 35,000 votes against192,000 votes in 2005, Goodwin says than in electoral terms, 
the “BNP has unquestionably become the most successful far-right party in British history”.20 
If in 2008, at local level, the BNP had 55 councillors across England and a 
representative in the London Assembly, it was unable to get any Member of Parliament 
during the 2010 general election despite fielding 339 candidates, a fact that reminds us of the 
“first-past-the-post electoral system” argument to explain the ups and downs of the BNP. 
 
In parallel with its electoral evolution, the ideology of the BNP has changed from its 
foundation in 1982 to the current party which participated in the last general election and 
which has, for a long time, presented many local councillors across England. Before assessing 
whether the party still belongs to the ERP’s family today, it is necessary to first illustrate 
different ways of defining the concepts of populism and extreme right. 
 
 
Defining extreme right 
 
At first glance, defining the extreme right ideology should be easy. As a discourse that 
opposes democratic values, the extreme right ideology should be against pluralism, human 
rights, freedom of speech, parliamentarism, etc. In reality, things are much more complicated 
mainly for four reasons: first, ERP have adapted their speech in the past 30 years; second, 
ERP use their electoral support to present themselves as democratic; third, ERP see their 
favourite issues taken over by mainstream parties; and fourth, the concept of extreme right 
does not mean that the values of the right are “simply understood and applied radically”, there 
is a gap between the right and the extreme right which does not appear with the concept of 
“extreme right”. 
First reason: the evolution of extremist parties over the past thirty years is crucial to 
understand the ideology of ERP. In all European countries, there are laws to curb racist, 
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xenophobic and “negationist” rhetoric that have been enacted in response to the electoral 
success of extreme right parties. These laws punish incitement to racist behaviour, notably 
against foreigners and migrants. After many convictions in Belgium, France, the Netherlands 
and many other countries, most extremist leaders have changed the way they talk about World 
War II and about migrants in general. Among others, to evade laws against racist discourses, 
they have replaced their overt xenophobia with a defence of “ethnic homogeneity”; to avoid 
“radical attacks on foreigners”, they have advocated the “right to cultural expression for their 
own people”; to avoid showing sympathy for fascism, they have championed a more 
consensual“European heritage”. Today, most of the parties try to change their discourse in 
order to avoid legal challenges and to give a better image of themselves to the electorate21. 
Second, ERP use their electoral support to present themselves as democratic. Extremist 
leaders from all over Europe have learned over the years how to use democratic rhetoric to 
legitimate the fact that xenophobic parties may now join government coalitions. Parties like 
the British National Party, the Belgian Front national, Alleanza Nazionale and Lega Nord in 
Italy, the late Lijst Pim Fortuyn and Partij voor de Vrijheid in the Netherlands, Ny Demokrati 
in Sweden, the Republikaner or the Deutsche Volksunion in Germany, the Dansk Folkeparti or 
Fremskridtspartiet in Denmark have all received large numbers of votes at several levels of 
power for many years. On this basis, they claim a “democratic” mandate to defend their own 
vision against what they labelled as “fake corrupted democrats” from mainstream parties.  
Third, defining the extreme right ideology is not easy because ERP see their favourite 
issues taken over by mainstream parties. The new face of the extreme right leads to some 
confusion regarding the difference between the democratic and the non-democratic right, the 
“soft” and the “hard” right. One explanation lies in the reappropriation of political issues such 
as crime, unemployment and immigration by most of the traditional parties. These issues were 
the landmark of ERP until mainstream parties decided to introduce them in their own political 
speeches. As a consequence, the myth of “Europe under siege” and the threat of uncontrolled 
migration and crime in the streets are no longer signs of rising fascism, or of a return to the 
“dark years” of the past.  
Fourth, the concept of extremism poses a problem raised by Billig in his contribution on 
the anti-Semitism of the extreme right. One of the difficulties with the “extreme right” label, 
he said, “is that it gives the impression of saying that these movements are like the non-
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extreme right, but just a little more to the right”.22 
Beyond these obstacles, the most frequent characteristics used to define the extreme 
right include extreme nationalism, racism, ethnocentrism, anti-communism, law and order, 
anti-pluralism and hostility to democracy. From one case to another, it is possible to add 
social Darwinism, xenophobia/heterophobia, authoritarianism, Führer worship, militarism, 
unwillingness to compromise, fanaticism, dogmatism, prone to conspiracy theories, a 
tendency to violence, etc23.  
Three common threads appear in the literature analysing the extreme right: first, an 
acknowledgement of inequality between people; second, nationalism as the proposal in 
support of acknowledging inequality; and third, extremism or radicalism, which should be 
understood as synonyms for absolute, violent and extreme positions on certain ideas, policies, 
parties, groups or people, but also as a means and a mode of action to achieve its objectives.24 
Inequality is the first mark of ERP ideology. The existence of races and the inequality 
and the hierarchy between them are present in both the discourse of openly racist and violent 
groups in the United States (neo-nazis, KKK, skinheads, etc.), and the discourse of ERP in 
Europe involved in the electoral process. Studying the French Front national, Bihr attempted 
to erect a permanent structure of extreme right thinking. According to him, it is based on 
“raising up inequality as a fundamental ontological and axiological category”.25 ERP are 
profoundly inegalitarian, they see inequality as a value to be promoted and defended, and they 
consider that it is fair that there should be people who are superior and others who are inferior, 
because that is quite simply “the natural order”.26 
In Flanders, before the Vlaams Blok changed its name (becoming the Vlaams Belang) 
and its programme in 2004, inequality between the races used to appear in their discourse as 
the work of Swyngedouw and Ivaldi have shown. According to the Vlaams Blok, 
egalitarianism is intrinsically false and goes against the law of nature.27 In the party’s 
ideology, the people are first an “ethnic community with hereditary links” and nationality 
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should be based on “biological consanguinity” following the “natural ethnic structure” with 
an organic and hierarchical meaning. Ethnicity is perceived by the Vlaams Blok as a blend of 
cultural, racial, linguistic and identity traits that point to both biological inequality between 
ethnic groups and nationalism as a method of protecting the superior ethnic group.  
Nationalism is the second tenet of ERP ideology, it is an ultimate political structure to 
put in place in support of the basic axiom relating to inequality. The extreme right promotes 
an intensified nationalism based on an ethno-national community, a community that is 
sometimes mobilised under the term “people” (“the French people”), considered in terms of 
its ethnic, “racial”, cultural, linguistic or historic unity, sometimes under the term “nation”. 
In the ERP ideology, the nation and the people are threatened by internal and external 
enemies and forces. The internal threat concerns the survival and the “biological” future of the 
social community. It lies in the falling birth rates in the majority of European countries at a 
time when the population is growing ever older. In the ERP ideology, a falling birth rate is the 
first sign of the disappearance of an ethnic group. The internal threat lies also in the legal and 
medical methods developed in Western countries to interrupt (abortion) or prevent 
(contraception) birth on demand, which are causing the birth rate to fall even further and 
therefore increasing the risks which threaten the future of the community. The internal threat 
lies in the new forms of living together that no longer place procreation at the centre of their 
interests, thereby aggravating the problems mentioned above: relationships outside marriage, 
homosexuality, feminism, singleness, etc.  
The external threat is perceived to be on three levels. The first danger follows a 
biological metaphor: immigrants are “foreign bodies” that “infect” a healthy and homogenous 
social body, and in doing so threaten the health and balance of that body (society). The second 
danger lies in the mixing of people that is considered by the extreme right to be a factor in the 
degradation, decline, disease and levelling. Finally, the third danger lies in the emergence of 
what is known as multicultural societies that, in the eyes of the extreme right, embody the 
triumph of disease and perversion within the ethnic community. Generally speaking, the 
external threat comes from international migratory flows and the presence of a growing 
population that is foreign or of foreign origin on the “national territories”.  
In order to deal with the problem of the numerous characteristics involved in defining 
ERP ideology, Backes proposes to analyse the extreme right as a sub-phenomenon of political 
extremism, and he therefore deems that a definition of right-wing extremism should have two 
components: the first should show in what way the phenomenon is extremist, the second 
10 
 
should show in what way the phenomenon is right-wing.28 In fact, the third main idea that 
supports the ERP ideology is extremism as an attitude that aims to act in a radical way, on the 
root (radix), on the deep cause of the effects or the phenomenon where change is desired. 
Extremism represents a type of “absolute” action, a “total” way of acting to give shape to the 
nationalist project in support of the acknowledgement of inequality.  
The ideology of the extreme right is often described as an anti-pluralist, anti-universal 
or anti-parliamentarian doctrine, sometimes as an anti-American, anti-communist or anti-
Zionist belief system, and sometimes as an anti-intellectual doctrine. In their pioneering work 
on the extreme right in the United States, Lipset and Raab systematised the functioning of 
these oppositions. Right-wing extremism, they explain, is the rejection of pluralism, politics 
and negotiations, the rejection of difference, divisions and ambivalence. According to the 
extreme right-wing ideology, difference means dissidence. In other words, they conclude, 
right-wing extremism is characterised by a sort of “monism” and philosophical, political and 
ideological simplism.29  
Betz bases his definition of the extreme right on the fundamental rejection of the rules 
of the democratic game, individual freedom, the principle of equality and equal rights for all 
members of the political community.30 Eatwell talks about hostility to democracy31 and 
Mudde talks about anti-democratism.32 Anti-democratism is also among the traits studied by 
Billig when he explains that the principles of nationalism blended with the extreme right are 
formulated in such a way that democratic rights and freedoms are threatened.33 
Ignazi explains that while it is well-known that the majority of the parties at the extreme 
right of the political spectrum do not openly describe themselves as anti-democratic, it is 
nevertheless true that they express anti-system views and that the culture that emerges from 
their internal publications and propaganda, from their leaders’ speeches and their executives’ 
and activists’ opinions can be considered anti-egalitarian, anti-pluralist and fundamentally 
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opposed to the principles of the democratic system.34  
 
Defining the populist rhetoric 
 
The concepts of populism and extreme right play an important part in structuring the 
political debate in Europe and the United States.35 If sometimes they refer to specific and 
identifiable cases such as the British National Front (extreme right), the French Front national 
in the 1980s (extreme right), or Geert Wilders and the Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV) in the 
Netherlands today (populist),36 both concepts can also lead to confusion. This section is 
grounded in the idea that populism differs from the extreme right and does not embody the 
same kind of threat that the extreme right does to liberal values and democracy.  
 
Discussions and debates in the media, in politics and in universities have offered an 
array of meanings for the concept of populism. One should therefore exercise caution when 
trying to craft a succinct definition of the term. In 1981, years before the concept was used as 
an anthem to attack adversaries on the political battlefield, Canovan stated that populism 
referred to a political style, demagogy or an electoral strategy rather than to a specific political 
ideology or doctrine,37 a statement that could lead academics to believe that unlike other 
political families, from liberalism to socialism, from fascism to Marxism, populism does not 
have any theorists of great stature or any elaborate doctrines.  
Nevertheless, if populism is a discourse or style rather than a doctrine or ideology, it is 
important not to ignore the representation of society and politics involved in populist 
movements: populism appeals both to the people and the elite, and attributes very specific 
characteristics to them that are of relevance. The concept of the “people” is an inevitable 
starting point. “Populist” leaders develop their arguments based on a certain idea of the people 
which leads to the notions of majority, homogeneity and hard work. Even if the people in 
populist discourse is portrayed as being excluded from the system, they represent the majority 
and therefore personify the “man on the street”, the “ordinary people”, they represent a group 
of individuals in society who share common traits, objectives and aspirations, and they also 
                                                 
34
 Piero Ignazi, “Les Partis d’extrême droite : les fruits inachevés de la société postindustrielle”, in Pascal 
Perrineau, Les Croisés de la société fermée : L’Europe des extrêmes droites, op. cit., p.371. 
35
 See Jérôme Jamin, L’Imaginaire du complot : Discours d’extrême droite en France et aux Etats-Unis, op. cit., 
2009. 
36
 Jérôme Jamin, “Vieilles pratiques et nouveaux visages : Geert Wilders et l’extrême droite en Europe”, 
Vacarme, n° 55, Spring 2011, 43-45. 
37
 Margaret Canovan, Populism, London: Junction Books, 1981. 
12 
 
have an easily identifiable characteristic: their hard-working nature.  
As for the elite, their characteristics in populist discourse are the exactly opposite of 
those of the people. The elite are described as being in the minority, as heterogeneous and 
lazy. The elite never represent more than a handful of individuals. According to Taguieff, 
whoever the individuals in “power” are, they are systematically described as a secret minority, 
“professional liars”.38 The majority, homogenous, hard-working people are opposed to the 
minority, heterogeneous, lazy elite: “It is impossible to honestly earn the fortune of a 
plutocrat,” the People’s Party was already saying in the late 19th century.39 
In the populist rhetoric, economic crises, insecurity, social struggles, inequalities, 
unemployment and many other major political themes are framed through a simplified prism 
that places two sole players in opposition to each other in an extremely tense relationship. 
This prism gives a dual vision of the social and political struggle in which two specific forces 
alone suffice to explain history and politics.40 The “simplifying dualism” of this narrative 
excludes all other players involved from the analysis and in general excludes all other causes 
that are usually evoked in this field. In populist thinking, there is a rejection of intermediary 
institutions in favour of a direct relationship between the people and its leaders,41 and to some 
extent, they reject politics.42 
Populism can equally be a right-wing or a left-wing phenomenon. Lazar describes left-
wing populism as an idealised representation of a people who are exploited but united, hard-
working and collectively productive, profoundly fair and good, virtuous and invincible.43 
Berlet considers that populist movements may be right-wing, left-wing or in the centre; they 
can be egalitarian or authoritarian, and rely either on a decentralised network or on a 
charismatic leader; they may demand new social and political relations or romanticise the 
past.44 
To promote such a vision of the world, the populist movement needs a charismatic 
leader, someone who will be able to benefit from his/her personality to talk about unity and 
hide the differences among the people he/she wants to unify against the elite45. 
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The BNP as an extreme right party 
 
Populism is not an ideology but a simplistic rhetoric that positions the people against 
the elite, a rhetoric that can fit with communism, socialism, conservatism or nationalism. In 
contrast, ERP express a true ideology with a given number of tenets that influence the way 
they see the people, the nation and its future: inequality, nationalism and radicalism/ 
extremism.With the evolution of the BNP in the previous years, we must now re-examine its 
current position assessing whether the party still belongs to the ERP as they are defined in the 
literature. To that purpose, we shall focus on the British National Party general election 
manifesto of 2010, Democracy, Freedom, Culture and Identity.46 
In several ways, the BNP manifesto offers more examples of an ERP manifesto than a 
populist one, even if some of the party’s main objectives can be explained through the 
populist dualism that positions the people against the elite. In several sections of the text, 
nationalism appears as a tool to protect a superior people against an inferior one. In the 
chapter on “Immigration”, the manifesto explains that current trends in immigration and 
fertility “will result in the extinction of the British people, culture, heritage and identity” 
(p. 16), concluding that “Britain’s existence is in grave peril”. Even if it is not explicit in the 
text, it is easy to see that, in the BNP’s rhetoric, the idea of blood and race are hidden behind 
that of culture and heritage. Two examples illustrate this, both in the section called 
“Abolishing Multiculturalism and Preserving Britain” (p. 22): 
 
We believe that the ability to create and sustain social and political structures in which individual 
freedom, equality before the law, private property and popular participation in decision-making are 
features, is an expression of blood. [...] To preserve the continued existence of our traditional 
democracy, we must therefore take the necessary measures to safeguard the existence of the native 
peoples of these islands and ensure they are the dominant ethnic, cultural and political group. 
 
Knowing how open racism has been counterproductive in both political and legal terms 
for the BNP, it is not surprising to see the manifesto talking about “blood” in a paragraph 
addressing democratic values such as “individual freedom, equality before the law, private 
property and popular participation in decision-making”, and to see the manifesto talking about 
supporting the “dominant group” in another paragraph, this time in ethnic, cultural and 
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political terms. Brought together, these paragraphs clearly establish links between blood and 
culture (which is a possible definition of race) as it appears in another section called “Culture, 
Traditions and Civil Society” (p. 44): “The people of England, Scotland, Wales and Ireland 
are bound together by blood and this close connection ensures an overlap of culture, heritage 
and tradition.” Examined together, these paragraphs establish a clear hierarchy between 
cultures, nations and races, between those who need to be dominant and the others (p. 23): 
“British people may take pride from knowing that the blood of an immense column of nation-
building, civilisation-creating heroes and heroines runs through their veins.” 
In the ERP ideology, the nation and the people are threatened by internal and external 
enemies and forces, nationalism in this context is a way to battle against these threats. Among 
them, we should mention the one which is the landmark of the extreme right: the external 
threat of immigration. On this topic, in a paragraph entitled “The disastrous Effect of Mass 
Immigration on British Society”, the BNP is clear (p. 17 and 18): 
 
There is no escaping the fact that the admission into this country of large numbers of foreigners 
has, inter alia, created a poorer, more violent, uncertain, disorientated, confused, politically correct, 
ill-educated, dependant, fractured society. […] the ongoing arrival into the UK of between 
300,000-500,000 Third World immigrants each year is an issue that all three of the old gang parties 
have refused to discuss. 
 
Along with the external threat, there is the internal threat which refers to the two main 
dangers: the threat of Islam, which is incompatible with democracy, and the changes in 
mentalities because of “cultural Marxism”. 
The threat of Islam is seen in the manifesto as an historical threat deeply rooted in the 
past, in the chapter entitled “Islam: Incompatible with Western Democracy” (p. 30), the 
manifesto explains that: 
 
[...] the historical record shows that Islam has, since its formation, been waging an almost constant 
war against Europe, impelled by its Qur’anic verses to convert all peoples of the earth to its belief 
system. Created in conflict, every advance that Islam has made in the Middle and Near East, in 
Africa, and its attempts to invade Europe through Spain, the Balkans, and Italy, has been under the 
threat of the scimitar, the cannon, and murderous atrocities.Today Europe faces a renewed Muslim 
invasion. This time the weapons are no longer the steel blade or cannon: they are the passport, the 
visa stamp, corrupt liberal Western regimes who have allowed mass Third World immigration, and 
the baby’s crib. These things are the new weapons by which Islam now seeks to conquer Europe 
and the West, having failed in earlier centuries to conquer Europeans by force. 
 
This “thesis” about a new tacit invasion of Europe is also a landmark of the ideology of 
the ERP. It comes from the book of Bat Ye'or, Eurabia: The Euro-Arab Axis, published in 
2005; it appears in the manifesto of Anders Behring Breivik, the Norwegian political 
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extremist who perpetrated the 2011 attacks in Norway; it is supported by ultra-conservative 
leaders in the US such as Pat Buchanan; and most ERP in Europe used it in their own 
justification of their fear of Islam (Vlaams Belang, Front national, Partij voor de Vrijheid, 
etc.). The description of Islam by the BNP leaves no doubt about the deep lack of respect for 
this population in the vision of the manifesto’s writers, and this has also to be analysed in 
connection with the hierarchy between races, cultures and peoples described above.  
In a section called “The Five Characteristics of Islam in European Nations”, the 
manifesto mentions “the appearance of Islamic extremism amongst many first, second or even 
third generation Muslim immigrants” and concludes that  “this extremism has as its primary 
root the traditional Islamic call to spread its religious worldview to all people, by force if 
necessary”. It notes also that the Muslim immigrant populations in European nations refuse: 
 
[...] to take on the native culture, and instead import their originating culture as part of a 
colonisation process. In this way, the dress (burkas, prayer coats, etc.), social behaviour (ritual 
animal sacrifice, religious practices which intrude, dominate, and drive away indigenous cultural 
practices—see mosque prayer calls in the traditionally British Christian city of Oxford as a 
primary example), arranged marriages, and many other Islamic cultural attributes are maintained, 
taught, and encouraged, while indigenous culture is deliberately suppressed. 
 
Later, the manifesto associates Muslim populations to “violent street riots, as have 
happened almost everywhere in Europe, but most noticeably in Paris and other French cities 
in recent years”. This example is important because it shows that the BNP does not consider 
the socioeconomic roots of the riots and instead prefers to develop an ethnic and religious 
explanation of the events in France. The BNP also notes that “Muslim students perform less 
well than non-Muslim students” and that when “it comes to university education the picture is 
equally gloomy”. Finally, the manifesto makes a clear connection between Islam and terror, 
reducing any Muslim to Bin Laden (p. 31 and 32): “The fifth characteristic of immigrant 
Muslim populations in all nations has been their widespread support for terrorism.” 
 
If the English Defence League (EDL47) says it has no connection with the BNP and if 
the later prohibit its members to participate to EDL’s rallies and demonstrations, it is clear that 
the hostility towards Muslim populations makes a solid bridge between both organizations in 
terms of ideas. 
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The internal threat is Islam but also the changes in mentalities because of “cultural 
Marxism”—a doctrine well-known by ERP intellectuals and used by Anders Breivik to 
organize its 2011 attack in Norway. Among others, cultural Marxism refers to the tools used 
by “leftists” and “globalists” to promote a “multicultural society” and legally punish all 
discourses that oppose such a project: “The BNP will repeal and abolish the following leftist 
social engineering projects which lie at the heart of the failed multicultural experiment which 
has brought Britain to the edge of disaster.” As way of example, the BNP will “repeal the 
Race Relations Act and all other artificial restrictions on free speech or employment”, will 
abolish “all targets and quotas for ethnic representation in all areas of employment, public and 
private”, will abolish “politically correct indoctrination of the police, teachers, and employees 
in the public sector”, will abolish “government-sponsored ethnicity-specific professional 
bodies, housing associations and other organizations”, will abolish “all departments, agencies 
or other agencies of government whose sole and specific function is to attend to the interests 
of ethnic minorities”, will abolish “ ‘positive discrimination’ schemes that have made native 
Britons second-class citizens”. The manifesto wants to repeal those laws, norms and 
requirements and put an end to the politically correct discourse that currently portrays 
mainstream politics. Following from this, the BNP will then be able to dismantle the 
European Union, an “Orwellian Super-State” and the engineer of a “multicultural society”:  
 
[The EU] is depriving our people of their inherited right to determine their affairs in their own 
traditional and democratically elected Parliament. In our Parliament’s stead is an unelected 
Commission, which initiates new laws behind closed doors and whose long-term ambitions 
embrace the extirpation of Britain as an identifiable nation. To facilitate the destruction of the 
nation states of Europe, including Britain, demographic change is being wrought, designed to strip 
indigenous peoples of their culture, heritage, history and traditions. 
 
The manifesto concludes its analysis with a clear conspiracy theory which is also at the heart 
of “cultural Marxism” (p. 27): “Multiculturalism is designed to balkanize the population, 
thereby undermining the integrity of the nation state and facilitating EU governance.” 
ERP ideology holds on the inequality between peoples, cultures and races, nationalism 
as a project, and radicalism or extremism. The latter appears clearly behind recent efforts by 
the BNP to abolish a long list of laws and decrees which support multiculturalism and 
tolerance. In addition to these proposals, the manifesto also seeks to “repeal the 1998 Human 
Rights Act and withdraw from the European Convention on Human Rights, both of which are 
exploited to abuse Britain’s hospitality by the world’s scroungers” (p. 6). It also wants to 
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reintroduce “capital punishment for child murderers, multiple murderers, murderers of 
policemen on duty and terrorists where guilt is beyond all doubt” (p. 48). 
In accordance with previous researches, our findings confirm the belonging of the BNP 
to the ERP family. Studying the 2004 elections and the BNP, David Renton explains that 
during the campaign, the party “was subject to a series of negative press stories”.48 Journalists 
from News of the World attended BNP rallies in Scotland, and, on one occasion, saw the party 
spokesman, Scott McLean, giving Nazi salutes, and, on another occasion, gathering around a 
KKK-style burning cross. The BNP has changed its discourse over the years, but as many 
authors have shown, it was less a change of vision than a change of language. To some extent, 
the BNP has followed the strategy of one of the most famous ERPs in Europe: the French 
Front national. As Goodwin put it, during the 1990s, “the BNP has sought to emulate the 
French Front national’s intensive local campaigns [...], as well as its ideological changes; in 
particular, the incorporation of ‘differentialist’ racism”, which means stressing cultural 
differences instead of genetic superiority.49 
Making the same observation, James Rhodes analyses that the “modernization project 
undertaken by the BNP has involved the party distancing itself from the ‘older’ fascist 
tradition in which other far-right political movements, such as the National Front (NF), have 
remained firmly rooted”. At an ideological level, Rhodes adds, “this has meant the adoption 
of a form of national-populism pioneered by the Front national in France”.50 
 
 
From extreme right to populism: The BNP today 
 
If the BNP has changed its speech through the years in order to raise its legitimacy and 
credibility, it remains, as its counterpart in France, a member of the ERP family. Nevertheless 
as we will now see, it now belongs also to the populist family on some issues. A shift which 
leads to an “anti-elite”-oriented rhetoricmore than a purely racist, anti-Semitic and 
xenophobic one. A shift that might explain the “mainstreamisation” of the party and its partial 
access to the media. 
Historically, the traditional enemy in extreme right discourse is personified by Jews, 
communists, feminists or freemasons to which we can add the external enemy personified by 
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foreigners, immigrants, or “false” refugees who try to enter the national territory. Over time, 
Muslims appeared as a new enemy whom one was to consider, like the Jews before them, 
both as internal and external to the nation: inside because they settled in our countries, outside 
because they are members of a vast conspiracy aiming at the “Islamisation of the West”. 
Since the late 1980s, and in particular since the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 
and the various treaties establishing the European Union, another new enemy has appeared in 
ERP discourse, an individual who is also at once inside and outside the nation: “the stateless, 
vagrant bureaucrats who control Brussels and Washington and are seeking to make the world 
into a vast market with no people and no soul, without a nation and without a culture”.51 As 
claimed in the BNP manifesto, these elites work against the people by building an “Orwellian 
Super-State” (p. 27), the European Union is the first step to a “worldwide government”. 
According to the BNP, the EU is “an organisation dedicated to usurping British sovereignty 
and to destroying our nationhood and national identity” (manifesto, p. 5). 
In twenty years, “the Brussels elite” have moved into second and sometimes first place 
surpassing other enemies, which makes the European Union a key issue for ERP today. 
Portrayed as being both everywhere and nowhere, the elite from Bruxelles have no cultural or 
national connections and is seeking to establish a multicultural global society that is at the 
mercy of the markets and finance. To some extent, the “stateless cosmopolitan bureaucrats” 
are now a greater threat than foreigners in numerous ERP discourses. Again, this needs to be 
put in connection with the attack from Anders Breivik in Norway, an attack that was not 
aiming at killing foreigners but “the future political elite” responsible for mass migration and 
“cultural Marxism”. 
The shared rejection of Europe fosters confusion between the populist discourses that 
are traditionally opposed to the elite (such as, among others, the rhetoric of the United 
Kingdom Independence Party52) and the extreme right discourses that have been opposed to 
Brussels since Maastricht.53 With the erosion of national sovereignty, opposition to the 
European programme has become central for the BNP, the Front national in France, the 
Vlaams Belang in Flanders and many other parties. The Brussels elite who now personify the 
new enemy in extreme right discourse also correspond to the “traditional elite” in the populist 
discourse. 
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Matthew Goodwin located the beginning of this shift a long time ago. Showing that the 
BNP and the French FN are far from being independent from each other, Goodwin argues that 
“the development of these parties is, to a certain degree, interlinked”. It “was the successful 
breakthrough of the French FN in 1984 that both publicised and made available to far-right 
parties elsewhere a new ‘master frame’; an ideological formula combining ethno-nationalist 
xenophobia, ethnopluralism and anti-establishment populism”.54  
The ERP discourse abandons biological racism and hierarchy between peoples in order 
to oppose the elite in the name of democracy—the elite being accused of orchestrating mass 
(international) migration. As James Rhodes explained: “Under the leadership of Nick Griffin, 
the BNP has made attempts to modernize and has tried to conceal its more esoteric ideology, 
such as holocaust denial and repatriation of non-whites, in favour of a ‘respectable’ political 
front.”55 The (discursive) shift of the BNP and its quest for credibility has led the media to 
legitimise its main concerns by covering, from now on, acceptable issues such as asylum, 
migration, Islam, etc. The media inadvertently give legitimacy to the party by opening debates 




The hybrid position of the BNP can be explained through different phenomena which 
lead us to the current relation between the party, the democratic values and mainstream 
politics of the UK. 
To many extents, the BNP has followed its counterparts in Europe in their ability to 
obtain more legitimacy in the eye of the media, the public opinion and even mainstream 
parties. As in France with the Front national or in the French-speaking part of Belgium with 
the Belgian Front national, the evolution of the legislation helped the BNP adapt its words 
and offer the same old message but with a new rhetoric. The BNP is condemning “cultural 
Marxism” which prohibits all anti-immigrants or anti-Islam political positions, but at the same 
time, and as a consequence, it has adapted its rhetoric to avoid legal condemnations and to 
obtain thereby some legitimacy. Strangely, the so-called “censorship of cultural Marxism” 
helped the BNP find its way to gain more credibility. 
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As in Flanders (in northern Belgium) with the Vlaams Belang, the BNP has also 
evolved in its permanent quest for power. Both parties took a very long time to realise they 
would not gain legitimacy and become more credible if they were not selecting their militants 
and executives more strictly, leaving behind controversial profiles linked with violent and 
racist groups, and looking for new charismatic and more qualified leaders. As the law has 
pushed the BNP towards a new rhetoric, the will to be one day in office has also changed the 
the kind of individuals supporting and working for the party. 
Finally, as its counterpart in the Dutch Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV) led by Geert 
Wilders,57 but also many other ERP in Europe, the BNP has embraced a deep intellectual 
change. It has put aside old discourses against migrants to champion either a “secular” or a 
“Christian” position against Islam. On the one hand, the manifesto reminds its electors of their 
Judaeo-Christian roots and the new threat coming—again—from the Arabs. The manifesto 
uses a “democratic” rhetoric about what the threat Islam supposedly means for a Christian 
Europe. On the other hand, as seen before, the party has managed to squeeze all its hatred of 
Islam in paragraphs devoted to freedom of expression, equal rights between men and women, 
democracy and so on. As Geert Wilders is sometimes considered in the Netherlands as a 
democrat denouncing “totalitarian Islam”, the BNP might change its image in a similar 
fashion in the future. 
All in all, if the adoption of new targets such as Islam or the Elite does not represent a 
fundamental change and to some extent illustrates a case of continuity (“the hunt for enemies” 
is still central) , the BNP has followed the same path as most ERP in Europe, changing its 











                                                 
57






Uwe Backes, “L’extrême droite : les multiples facettes d’une catégorie d’analyse” in Pascal 
Perrineau, Les croisés de la société fermée. L’Europe des extrêmes droites, Paris : Editions de 
l’aube, 2001, p. 13 –29. 
 
Chip Berlet et Matthew Lyons, Right-Wing Populism in America, New York : Guilford Press, 
2000. 
 
Hans-Georg Betz, The New Politics of the Right, New York : St. Martin’s Press, 1998. 
 
Hans-Georg Betz, “Conditions Favouring the Success and Failure of Radical Right-Wing 
Populist Parties in Contemporary Democracies” in Yves Meny and Yves Surel, Democracies 
and the populist challenge, New York : Palgrave, 2002, 197-213. 
 
Alain Bihr, L’actualité d’un archaïsme. La pensée d’extrême droite et la crise de la 
modernité, Lausanne : Editions Page deux, 1998. 
 
Michael Billig, “The Extreme Right : Continuities in Anti-Semitic Conspiracy Theory in Post-
War Europe” in Roger Eatwell and Noël O’Sullivan, The Nature of the Right, London : Pinter 
Publishers Limited, 1989, 146-166. 
 
Benjamin Bowyer, “Local context and extreme right support in England : The British 
National Party in the 2002 and 2003 local elections” in Electoral Studies, 27, 2008, 611-620. 
 
Margaret Canovan, Populism, London : Junction Books, 1981. 
 
Nigel Copsey and Graham Macklin, British National Party. Contemporary Perspectives, New 
York : Routledge, 2011. 
 
Kristin Couper and Danilo Martucelli, “L’expérience britannique” in Michel Wieviorka (ed.), 
Racisme et xénophobie en Europe, Paris, Editions la Découverte, 1994, 29-102. 
 
Roger Eatwell, “The extreme right and British exceptionalism : the primacy of politics” in 
Paul Hainsworth, The Politics of the extreme right, London, A Continuum Imprint, 2000.  
 
Roger Eatwell, “The Rebirth of the ‘Extreme Right’ in Western Europe? ” in Parliamentary 
Affairs, N°53, 2000, 407-425. 
 
Matthew Goodwin, “The Extreme Right in Britain: Still an ‘Ugly Duckling’ but for How 
Long?” in The Political Quarterly, 2007, Vol.78, N°2, 241-250. 
 
Matthew Goodwin, New British Fascism: Rise of the British National Party, Abingdon and 
New York: Routledge, 2011. 
 
Piero Ignazi, “Les partis d’extrême droite : les fruits inachevés de la société postindustrielle”, 
in Perrineau Pascal, Les croisés de la société fermée. L’Europe des extrêmes droites, Paris : 




Jérôme Jamin, “Fédéralisme et extrême droite au Royaume-Uni” in Fédéralisme et 
Régionalisme, Liège : Université de Liège, février 2004, 63-84. 
 
Jérôme Jamin, Faut-il interdire les partis d’extrême droite ? Démocratie, droit et extrême 
droite, Bruxelles et Liège : Les Editions Luc Pire et Les Territoires de la mémoire, collection 
Voix de la mémoire, 2005. 
 
Jérôme Jamin, “The Extreme Right in Europe. Fascist or Mainstream?” in The Public Eye, 
Boston : Political research Associates, Vol.19, N°1, 2005. 
 
Jérôme Jamin, L'imaginaire du complot. Discours d'extrême droite en France et aux Etats-
Unis, Amsterdam : Amsterdam University Press, 2009. 
 
Jérôme Jamin, “Vieilles pratiques et nouveaux visages. Geert Wilders et l'extrême droite en 
Europe” in Vacarme, N°55, Printemps 2011. 
 
Jérôme Jamin, “Two Different Realities: Notes on Populism and the Extreme Right” in 
Mammone, Andrea, Godin Emmanuel and Jenkins Brian (eds), Varieties of Right-Wing 
Extremism in Contemporary Europe? London, Routledge, 2012. 
 
Jérôme Jamin, “Image du peuple, image de l’élite” in Les nouveaux habits du populisme 
(dossier spécial), Politique Revue de débats, N°75, 2012. 
 
Peter John and Helen Margetts, “The Latent Support for the Extreme Right in British Politics” 
in West European Politics, Vol.32, N°3, 2009, 496-513. 
 
Ernesto Laclau, La raison populiste, Paris : Seuil, 2008. 
 
Marc Lazar, “Populisme et communisme : le cas français” in Taguieff Pierre-André, Le retour 
du populisme. Un défi pour les démocraties européennes, Paris : Encyclopaedia Universalis, 
2004, 83-94. 
 
Andrea Mammone, “The Eternal Return? Faux Populism and Contemporarization of Neo-
Fascism across Britain, France and Italy”, Journal of Contemporary European Studies, Vol. 
17, No. 2, 2009. 
 
Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl Raab, The Politics of Unreason. Right-Wing Extremism in 
America, 1790-1970, New York : Harper Torchbook, 1973. 
 
Cas Mudde, “The War of Words. Defining the Extreme Right Party Family” in West European 
Politics, Vol.19, N°2, April 1996, 225-248. 
 
David Renton, “’A day to make history’? The 2004 elections and the British National Party” 
in Patterns of Prejudice, 2005, 25-45. 
 
James Rhodes, “The political breakthrough of the BNP : The case of Burnley” in British 
Politics, Vol.4, 1, 2009, 22-46. 
 
James Rhodes, “White Backlash, ‘Unfairness’ and Justifications of British National Party 




Jean-Pierre Rioux, Les populismes, Paris : Seuil, 2007. 
 
Marc Swyngedouw and Gilles Ivaldi, “The Extreme Right Utopia in Belgium and France : 
The Ideology of the Flemish Vlaams Blok and the French Front National” in West European 
Politics, Vol.24, N°3, (July 2001), 1-22. 
 
Pierre-André Taguieff (ed.), Face au racisme, (tome II), Paris : La Découverte, 1991. 
 
Pierre-André Taguieff , L’illusion populiste, Paris : Berg International, 2002. 
 
Michael Wine, “Royaume-Uni” in Les extrémismes en Europe, Paris / Bruxelles : CERA / 





Websites :  
 
http://www.bnp.org.uk/ 
 
http://englishdefenceleague.org/ 
 
http://www.ukip.org/ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
